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This paper outlines a framework for task representation and discusses applications to
interference tasks in individual and joint settings. The framework is derived from the
Theory of Event Coding (TEC). This theory regards task sets as transient assemblies
of event codes in which stimulus and response codes interact and shape each
other in particular ways. On the one hand, stimulus and response codes compete
with each other within their respective subsets (horizontal interactions). On the other
hand, stimulus and response code cooperate with each other (vertical interactions).
Code interactions instantiating competition and cooperation apply to two time scales:
on-line performance (i.e., doing the task) and off-line implementation (i.e., setting
the task). Interference arises when stimulus and response codes overlap in features
that are irrelevant for stimulus identification, but relevant for response selection. To
resolve this dilemma, the feature profiles of event codes may become restructured
in various ways. The framework is applied to three kinds of interference paradigms.
Special emphasis is given to joint settings where tasks are shared between two
participants. Major conclusions derived from these applications include: (1) Response
competition is the chief driver of interference. Likewise, different modes of response
competition give rise to different patterns of interference; (2) The type of features in
which stimulus and response codes overlap is also a crucial factor. Different types
of such features give likewise rise to different patterns of interference; and (3) Task
sets for joint settings conflate intraindividual conflicts between responses (what), with
interindividual conflicts between responding agents (whom). Features of response codes
may, therefore, not only address responses, but also responding agents (both physically
and socially).
Keywords: task, event codes, response conflict, agent conflict, interference, task sharing
Tasks as Targets of Research
Experimental research in cognition and action relies on the study of performance in controlled
environmental settings. Reaction time tasks provide a typical example of the way in which this
research is conducted. The mentioned tasks require participants to perform certain actions in
response to certain events, thereby following certain rules they have been instructed to follow (or,
in somewhat more technical terms, to select and perform speeded responses to upcoming stimuli
according to pre-specified mapping rules). Task performance is assessed in terms of reaction
time, that is, the time that elapses between stimulus presentation and response onset. Observed
relationships between experimental conditions and task performance then lay the ground
for theory building. Theories specify representational architectures and functional processing
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mechanisms that may underlie (and hence explain) the empirical
observations reflecting these relationships.
In this approach tasks are tools, not targets of research. Tasks
are understood as means for providing the information that
theory requires, without being studied as ends in themselves. For
instance, to run a memory experiment it is taken for granted
that participants understand the instructions and implement
an appropriate task set, that is a cognitive representation
of the task, and that subserves both implementing the task
and performing it. Researchers take the operation of task
sets for granted in the same way that tailors take the
workings of scissors and sewing machines for granted. Just
as tailors use these tools for making garments and robes,
researchers use tasks as tools for building theories. These
theories address cognitive architectures and mechanisms, but
not the tasks used to probe them. As long as the tools
that researchers use are instrumental for attaining the desired
targets, they can afford to be ignorant about their technical
functionality.
While it is, on the one hand, perfectly justified to use tasks as
tools for theory-driven research, it is, on the other hand, certainly
no less legitimate to address tasks as targets of theory-driven
research. This is what the present paper aims at. Importantly,
theories of task representation and control will not only shed
light on the workings of research tools in experimental settings,
but also elucidate a central feature of human performance, viz.
the interaction between bottom-up and top-down control of
cognition and action. Tasks require us to pursue goals and
perform goal-directed actions under appropriate circumstances.
Thus, in a sense, we may see ourselves engaging in tasks
all the time in everyday life. From this perspective research
tools for experimental settings may be seen to instantiate a
constituitive feature of action control in more natural settings.
Understanding one will therefore translate into understanding
the other.
More than a century ago Ach (1905) pioneered an approach
to the representational underpinnings of task control. In his
studies of simple arithmetic tasks the main focus was the
issue of how a task’s goal (e.g., to multiply two digits) is
represented besides the material objects to which it applies (i.e.,
the digits presented). In his theoretical account he introduced
the famous notion of determining tendencies that were meant
to instantiate intended goals, on top of reproductive tendencies
meant to instantiate represented objects. Ach’s analysis was
based on both, subjective experience (i.e., introspection) and
objective performance (i.e., measurements). In the meantime
reliance on subjective experience has, for a number of good
reasons, become much weaker than reliance on objective
performance. One of the classical instruments for objective
assessment of task performance is provided by reaction time
tasks, on which I will focus here. Typical issues that come
to mind when we raise these tasks from tools to targets of
enquiry include questions such as: How can we characterize
task sets? How can they be acquired either through learning or
verbal instruction? Which kinds of representational resources
does their implementation require? How are stimuli and
responses represented? How can mapping rules be instantiated
in task sets? What does it take to move from representation
to control, that is, from understanding a task to carrying
it out?
The last two decades have witnessed the emergence of a
wealth of literature on issues of cognitive control in reaction
time tasks (Kiesel et al., 2010; Koch et al., 2010; Logan et al.,
2014; Verbruggen et al., 2014). The main bulk of this literature
is based on paradigms for the study of flexibility in task
representation and control (e.g., in tool use, task switching
and stop signal paradigms). Accordingly, the theoretical focus
is on short-term changes within and between task sets, rather
than structural and functional organization of task sets per se.
While these paradigms study in some detail how task sets
persist and change over time, they pay less attention to
their microstructure, that is, the way in which the event
representations involved in a given task set interact with
each other and become shaped by the demands of the task
at hand.
In this paper I argue for extending this approach. My aim
is twofold. The first aim is to outline a framework for task set
representation that addresses both, mapping relations between
and content profiles within representations. Essentially, the
framework claims that the implementation of a given task set
does not only act to establish appropriate mappings (between
representations of pertinent events like stimuli, responding
actions and action effects), but also appropriate feature profiles
(within event representations). In fact, it even argues that
mappings between representations are instantiated through
overlap of their feature profiles. The framework is derived from
Ideomotor Theory and the Theory of Event Coding (TEC). Both
view stimuli, responses and response outcomes as commensurate
events that share a common representational domain (Prinz,
1987, 1990, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz et al., 2009;
Memelink and Hommel, 2013).
The second aim is to apply this framework to scenarios
in which the task is embedded in a minimal social context.
To pursue this aim, we will study experimental settings in
which a reaction time task is shared between two participants
(namely, task sharing settings). Findings from a number of
recent studies have been understood to suggest that in such
settings participants do not only represent their own share
of the task, but also co-represent their partner’s share—even
if that share is entirely irrelevant for their own performance
(Sebanz et al., 2003, 2005, 2006). For instance, when a Simon
task is divided between two participants (so that each takes
care of one of the two relevant stimulus features and one of
the two response key assigned to it), a spatial compatibility
effect is observed for each of them—as in the standard version
of the task in which a single participant takes care of both
stimulus features and their assigned response keys. In contrast,
no such effect is obtained when participants perform their
task share alone, that is, without another being present. It
has therefore been suggested that sharing a task with another
invites implementing the full task; representing one’s own
share and co-representing one’s partner’s share (Sebanz et al.,
2005; Atmaca et al., 2008; Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009). This
is where the second aim comes in; to find out what the role
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of co-representation can be in a broader framework for task
representation.
The following discussion will take two major steps. The first
step will outline a general framework for task representation,
focusing on ways in which task demands shape representational
content. The second step will then apply the logic of the
framework to various kinds of interference paradigms, thereby
gradually moving from unshared to shared settings. As we will
see, the notion of co-representation will be lost in doing so,
suggesting the radical conclusion that we don’t need it at all (Dolk
et al., 2011, 2013; Dolk and Prinz, in press; Wenke et al., 2011).
A Framework for Task Representation
What does it take to carry out a reaction time task? Essentially, we
may discern two levels of task description, external/observational
and internal/theoretical. Adopting an external point of view,
we may observe certain kinds of events taking place in
the experimental setting. Typically, we observe an individual
generating certain actions in response to certain stimuli
presented to them, thereby following certain rules to which
they have committed themselves. For instance, in the Simon
task the individual may map red vs. green stimulus patches
appearing on the screen to pressing left vs. right response keys
mounted on the table, based on rules provided by preceding
instructions.
Conversely, adopting an internal point of view, we may
address the putative cognitive architecture whose structural
and functional features are meant to account for observed
performance. Typically, we invoke an architecture harboring
stimulus representations, response representations, and linkages
established between them. Stimulus representations are
understood as internal placeholders for external stimulus
events, generated and maintained on the sensory input side of
the architecture. Response representations are understood as
internal placeholders for external response events, generated and
maintained on the motor output side. Finally, linkages between
stimulus and response representations are understood as internal
placeholders for the stimulus-to-response mappings required by
the instruction.
Even though the internal description does not provide much
more than an internalized version of the external account,
it has over the past decades made its career as a fairly
successful theoretical framework for the analysis of cognitive
task performance. Building on early pioneers, for example,
Broadbent, Posner, Sanders, and Welford, it has meanwhile
reached the status of classical textbook wisdom (e.g., Broadbent,
1958; Welford, 1968, 1980; Sternberg, 1969; Posner, 1986;
Sanders, 1998). Nonetheless, it has not gone unchallenged.
The critical challenge comes from observations on so-called
privileged linkages between perception and action and related
theoretical claims for a functional role of similarity in the
operations subserving these linkages (Prinz, 1990, 1997; Prinz
and Hommel, 2002). The crucial observation here is that
stimulus events can often more easily be linked to response
events resembling them, as compared to non-resembling ones.
For instance, in the Simon task a stimulus patch on the left
side of the screen can be more easily and more efficiently
linked to a key press response on the left side, as compared
to the right side. The same holds true not only for a
number of further instances of stimulus-response compatibility
effects (e.g., Fitts and Seeger, 1953; Fitts and Deininger, 1954;
Alluisi and Warm, 1990; Kornblum et al., 1990; Reeve and
Proctor, 1990) but also for instances of action induction
and action imitation (Lotze, 1852; Carpenter, 1874; Piaget,
1945/2013; Liberman et al., 1967; Meltzoff and Moore, 1977;
Knuf et al., 2001; Prinz et al., 2005; for overviews cf., e.g.,
Prinz, 1987, 1990; Meltzoff and Prinz, 2002; Hurley and Chater,
2005a,b).
The classical framework has no obvious way to account
for such similarity-based linkages between perception and
action. This is because it regards linkages between input
and output as arbitrary connections between incommensurate
representations—incommensurate in the sense that they do not
share any features on which the operation of similarity can be
established. This is where the TEC and the notion of Common
Coding comes into place (Prinz, 1990, 1997; Hommel et al.,
2001). They suggest extending the classical framework in a
way that, atop of arbitrary linkages between incommensurate
representations, also permits similarity-based linkages between
commensurate representations.
Common Coding invokes an architecture of two parallel
systems mediating between perception and action: a primary
system for linking incommensurate sensory and motor
representations, and a secondary one for linking commensurate
cognitive representations of input events (stimuli) and
output events (responses). While the primary system relies
on arbitrary, contiguity-based linkages between input- and
output- representations, the secondary system also allows for
non-arbitrary, similarity-based linkages (mapping vs. matching
between input and output representations).
With these extensions in mind, let us now see how
we can apply basic notions of Event Code Theory to
issues of task representation and task set formation. In this
section we discuss some basic claims concerning structure
and function of the required representational machinery. The
first, perhaps most important claim addresses the functional
locus of that machinery. We posit that flexible cognitive
task performance is mainly, if not entirely, organized by the
secondary system. Unlike the primary sensory-motor system
whose representational structure relies on long-term sensory and
motor experience, the secondary, cognitive system is flexible
enough to allow for creating short-lived and task-specific
representational structures (task sets) and, at the same time,
penetrable and transparent enough to allow for these structures
being shaped and modulated through verbal communication
(instructions). Accordingly, our discussion will focus on ways in
which the secondary system subserves task representation and
performance.
Event Codes
The Theory of Event Codes (TEC) offers a framework for
characterizing the basic structure of event representation in the
secondary system (Prinz, 1990; Hommel et al., 2001). TEC views
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task sets as assemblies of event codes that are organized in specific
ways. Thus, in order to understand how these assemblies are
organized and how they work, we first need to understand what
event codes are and how they interact with each other.
Representational function—The basic idea is simple (and
perhaps trivial). Event codes are cognitive representations of a
variety of things and events that an individual’s mental activity
may address. Importantly, event codes may be placeholders for
things and events in different modalities of existence (and even
non-existence): things that happen, or ought to happen, in the
past, present and future (and even those that do not happen).
For the present discussion we take the workings of event
codes for granted, without addressing the intricate issue as
to how they may be generated and individuated from the
continuous flow of information to which individuals are exposed.
While this issue may be difficult to solve for natural scenarios,
we may set it aside when discussing experimental settings.
Such settings are actually designed in terms of well-defined
things and events, so that we may assume that participants
generate task-specific assemblies of event codes whose structure
mirrors the structure of events that actually happen in these
settings. While some of these events are explicitly mentioned
in the instruction, others are introduced in other ways that
give rise to the formation of pertinent codes. Accordingly,
while we do not offer a detailed account of how these
codes are generated, we do maintain that assemblies of task-
specific event codes reflect the basic structure of task-specific
events.
To fulfill their representational function, event codes need
to be equal and mutually commensurate, even if the things
and events they represent are incommensurate. How can this
be possible? For instance, how can such diverse things like
external stimulus events that are controlled and generated by
the experimenter (e.g., a color patch appearing on the screen)
and internal response events that are controlled and generated
by the participant (e.g., her hand pressing a response key)
be represented in a common format? As has been argued
elsewhere (Prinz, 1992; Hommel et al., 2001; Memelink and
Hommel, 2005, 2006, 2013; Prinz et al., 2009), distal reference
is the key feature here. Event codes are commensurate in
virtue of referring to distal events in the world and body.
They are, in other words, placeholders for external events
outside the representing system, but not for internal events that
instantiate their representational function in that system (be it
at the proximal level of sensors/effectors or the central level of
the brain).
Structure—A convenient way of conceiving the structure
of event codes is to regard them as feature compounds in
semantic space (Hommel, 1997, 2009, 2013; Hommel et al.,
2001). According to this view, event codes are instantiated
in local, transient feature networks that are generated from
resources provided by a global, permanent space of semantic
features. For instance, a color patch on a screen may
be represented by a compound of features, for example,
red, round, small, at-top-of-screen, on-left-hand-side, etc. The
formation of event codes thus requires and presupposes
the existence of a global space of semantic features that
provides the building blocks for their making. Notably,
this space is semantic in the weak sense of codes being
grounded in sensory and motor activity, not in the strong
sense of codes serving as symbolic placeholders for external
events.
Taking these building blocks for granted, we might examine
how event codes are formed from them. To this end we
outline their elementary structure and discuss ways in which
they may change over time. A basic outline is depicted
in Figure 1A. It shows a hypothetical feature compound
which is characterized (i) through a particular set of features
involved in it; and (ii) a particular pattern of connectivity
interlinking them. It goes without saying that this sketch must
be understood as an abstract, highly impoverished illustration
of the underlying idea. The complexity of true event codes
will exceed that of the sketch by several orders of magnitude
(in terms of both, number of features and complexity of
connectivity).
At this point it should not go unnoticed what the sketch fails
to show. It fails to show that the feature compounds instantiating
event codes are local structures embedded in a global space. This
embeddedness has important implications. In the same way as
any given code comprises a number of features, any given feature
contributes to a number of codes. As a result event codes may
overlap with respect to their features. As we will discuss below,
such feature overlap plays a crucial role for interactions between
event codes in task set formation.
A structure such as the compound depicted in Figure 1A
can undergo various kinds of changes (Memelink and Hommel,
2013). While some such changes may pertain to the pattern
of connectivity among given features, others, on which we
focus here, pertain to the profile of their contributions to the
FIGURE 1 | (A) Feature compound with equal weights; (B) Same compound
with different weights (indicated by node size); (C) Same compound with one
of the original features deleted (dotted) and a novel feature included (black).
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compound. So far we have described in inclusion of features
in event codes as an all-or-nothing affair. Figure 1B shows a
somewhat more realistic picture, assuming that features may
differ in their relative contributions to a given code. While some
features may be defining and essential, others may be more
or less an accessory for representating an event. For instance,
the color of the patch on the screen may be crucial to the
task at hand whereas its shape may be irrelevant. Accordingly,
when characteristics of things and events become relevant or
irrelevant in particular settings, this will alter the relative weights
with which corresponding features contribute to the event codes
representing them. The pattern of feature weights thus specifies
what we may call the weight profile of an event code. Below, we
discuss ways in which that profile may becomemodulated by task
context.
Restructuring weight profiles may be regarded as a weak way
of altering the content of feature compounds. A more effective
way is to alter feature profiles themselves, that is, to include new
and/or delete old features altogether, as illustrated in Figure 1C.
In one sense these alterations may also be considered weight
changes (viz., down to zero and up to a value above zero,
respectively). Yet, in another sense they have deeper implications
than just weight alterations. This is because they furnish feature
compounds with an enormous degree of structural flexibility;
the capacity to grow and shrink on demand. As we will see
below, this capacity turns out to be of utmost importance for
tailoring the content of event codes to the demands of the task
at hand.
Interactions—If feature weights and profiles can bemodulated
that way—what factors are modulating them? The basic claim
here is that the structure of code profiles at a given time is
mainly (if not entirely) determined by the history of interactions
between these codes. According to this view, any event code that
is involved in the representation of a given scenario becomes
selectively tuned to the needs of efficient interaction with other
codes involved in the same scenario.
Consider for illustration a simplified scheme with two
intersecting and interacting event codes (Figure 2A). Each
code exhibits both shared and unshared features. While shared
features are common to both codes (and, hence, non-distinctive),
unshared features are specific for each of them (and, hence,
distinctive). Depending on the interaction in which the two
codes are involved, such overlap may either be beneficial or
detrimental. Overlap should be beneficial in scenarios requiring
code cooperation, i.e., that both are jointly activated at the same
time. In contrast, overlap should be detrimental in scenarios
requiring code competition, i.e., that only one of them is activated
(and the other silenced) at the same time. While cooperation
requires that activating one code partially co-activates the other,
competition requires that one must be shielded from being co-
activated by the other.
The scheme depicted in Figure 2A invites obvious
measures for improving the efficiency of both cooperation
and competition. These measures rely on altering the structure
of code profiles according to given requirements. Measures
supporting cooperation are shown in Figures 2B,C. They may
pertain to the overlap zone (strengthening weights and creating
FIGURE 2 | Two overlapping event codes, instantiated as intersecting
feature compounds (C1 and C2 with red and blue edges, respectively).
Overlap is indicated by feature nodes on which red and blue edges converge
(= shared features). (A) Initial scheme with equal feature weights. (B–E)
Possible structural changes under conditions of code cooperation (B,C) and
code competition (D,E). (B) Strengthening shared features through (i)
increasing weights of old features (node size); and (ii) including new features
that are shared (black); (C) Weakening unshared features through weight
reduction and deletion (dotted); (D) Weakening shared features through
weight reduction and deletion; (E) Strengthening unshared features through
weight increase and inclusion of novel features.
new features that are shared) or to non-overlap zones (weakening
weights and deleting unshared features). Likewise, measures
supporting competition are shown in Figures 2D,E. Again, they
may pertain to the overlap zone (weakening weights and deleting
shared features) or to non-overlap zones (strengthening weights
and creating novel, unshared features).
In sum, we see two basic factors at work in tailoring profiles of
feature assemblies to context conditions: initial pattern of overlap
(shared vs. unshared features) and required mode of interaction
(cooperation vs. competition). We claim that these two factors
enter learning algorithms for optimizing the efficiency of event
codes for processing under given conditions of overlap and
interaction. As we will see in the subsequent section, these
algorithms play an important role as tools for the formation of
task sets. To understand this role we do not need to specify how
they work in detail. The only thing we need to accept is that they
exist and perform their function.
Task Sets
The application of these ideas to task sets and task set formation
is fairly straightforward. As indicated above, the concept of task
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set refers to the representational underpinnings of performance
in S-R mapping tasks. Our framework claims that event codes
provide the basic equipment from which task sets are made.
More specifically, it regards task sets as particular kinds of
assemblies of such codes. Of these assemblies we demand
that they must be organized in ways that allow us to derive
basic patterns of task performance from basic patterns of code
interaction.
The classical approach to capturing the functional logic of
S-R mapping tasks addresses three fundamental sets of task
components (cf., e.g., Garner, 1962, 1974; Kornblum et al.,
1990; Kornblum, 1992): stimulus set (the set of possible stimulus
events), response set (the set of possible responding actions), and
mapping rules (the set of prescriptions for assigning responding
actions to stimulus events).
While these components address task structure and off-line
implementation, basic operations address task performance
and on-line execution: stimulus presentation (presenting
an element from the stimulus set) and response selection
(selecting an element from the response set). Seen from the
participant’s perspective, stimulus presentation is under external
control (i.e., the experimenter’s protocol), whereas response
selection is under internal control (i.e., the participant’s action
decision).
Task implementation and performance are thus both
grounded in interactions among event codes that are involved in
task sets (summarized under the notion of intentional weighting
by Memelink and Hommel, 2013). As illustrated in Figure 3,
these interactions transform the initial structure of event code
assemblies into a final, task-specific structure. In essence, we
may discern two basic kinds of such interactions, horizontal and
vertical. Both aim at optimizing task set structure and function.
At the level of implementation they tailor the content profiles
of stimulus and response codes to the demands of the task at
hand. At the level of performance they strengthen cooperation
and weaken competition.
Horizontal Interactions
Primarily, a task requires identification of stimulus events and
selection of appropriate actions for response. Thus, when viewed
in terms of event codes and event code assemblies, each of these
two operations seems to entail the selection of one element from
a set of competing elements. In terms of the scheme depicted
in Figure 3, such selective competition requires horizontal
interactions within stimulus and response codes, respectively.
Stimulus identification selects one particular stimulus code from
the set of alternative stimulus codes involved in the task.
Likewise, response selection selects one particular response code
from the set of alternative response codes.
As discussed above, code competition requires structuring the
underlying event code assemblies accordingly. An obvious way of
achieving this is to strengthen distinctiveness among competing
codes through weakening their mutual overlap. As a result of
such distinctive tuning, conflict will be reduced and the efficiency
of selection will increase. Importantly, this applies to operations,
stimulus identification, and response selection (triggered by
external presentation and internal decision, respectively).
FIGURE 3 | Interactions between event codes in task set formation.
(A) Initial structure of a hypothetical event code assembly, with two partially
overlapping stimulus codes (S1/S2) and two partially overlapping response
codes (R1/R2). (B) Final structure of the same assembly, with initial horizontal
overlap among stimulus and response codes deleted (unconnected dotted
features) and new vertical overlap between stimulus and response codes
created. Note that the final structure of the assembly differentiates between
wanted and unwanted S-R assignments (wanted: S1–R1 and S2–R2;
unwanted: S1–R2 and S2–R1). To illustrate, consider a task requiring left key
presses in response to squares (S1→R1) and right key presses in response to
circles (S2→R2). An efficient task set must, on the one hand, weaken, or
delete features that are shared among the competing stimuli and the
competing responses (like, e.g., the closedness of the two shapes and the
downward-directed push of the two key presses, respectively). On the other
hand, it must implement the required mappings by creating overlap between
distinctive features of stimuli and responses (such as, e.g., straight lines/left
key vs. curved lines/right key) and creating new functional features
instantiating these mappings.
Vertical Interactions
So far we have not yet addressed the role of mapping
rules. Mapping rules are prescriptive. Essentially, they
require that activation of particular stimulus codes must
be followed by activation of particular response codes.
Thus, in order to instatiate these rules, the involved event
code assemblies need to establish some kind of selective
cooperation between stimulus and response codes. Selective
cooperation tunes stimulus codes to assigned actions and/or
response codes to assigned stimuli. With reference to the
scheme in Figure 3, selective cooperation requires vertical
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interactions between stimulus and response codes. These
interactions may take two complementary forms, aiming
at facilitating wanted and impeding unwanted mappings,
respectively.
When a task comprises n stimuli and m responses, the total
number of possible S-R–mappings equals n×m. Within the total
set of possible mappings, instructions introduce a distinction
between two subsets: that of wanted, correct mappings and that
of unwanted, incorrect mappings. Whilst wanted mappings yield
correct responses, unwanted mappings yield errors. Efficient task
sets thus require both, to facilitate wanted und impede unwanted
mappings.
Wanted mappings—Implementation of wanted mappings
requires selective cooperation between particular stimulus and
response codes. An obvious way of achieving this is to create
selective overlap between the involved codes. As an example,
we may once again consider a simple choice task that requires
pressing a left vs. right key in response to a red vs. green color
patch. A mapping such as this is initially entirely arbitrary.
Before the task is administered, linkages between features such as
left–red or right–green do not exist. Pertinent event codes are, at
this time, entirely disjunct. This is where instructions intervene.
Instructions act to create patterns of selective overlap. These
zones of overlap instantiate the required mappings between
stimulus events and responding actions. Basically, we may
imagine two ways of creating such overlap: integration of old
features and generation of new ones.
The first option is to integrate given stimulus features into
response codes and/or given response features into stimulus
codes. As a result, red becomes integrated into the response
code for left key presses, and/or left becomes integrated into the
stimulus code for red patches. The second option is to generate
new features and assign them to stimulus and response codes
that are required to cooperate. As a result, the new feature xyz
becomes integrated into both the stimulus code for red patches
and the response code for left key presses.
At first glance such feature assignments appear to be fairly
arbitrary and strange. Yet, we need to remind ourselves that
features are freefloaters and not naturally and intrinsically tied to
the stimulus or the response domain. Each feature can therefore,
at least in principle, become integrated into each kind of code.
Furthermore we also need to remind ourselves that features are
semantic elements that may not only address physical properties
of things and events (such as colors of patches or locations of
response keys), but also functional properties (such as locations
belonging to given colors or colors belonging to given locations
etc.). Such functional features can be seen to represent the fact
that the two events are assigned to each other in the current task.
Instructions thus act to create new overlap, either based on
old or new features. In virtue of such overlap, codes for red
patches will co-activate codes for left key presses and likewise
will codes for left key presses co-activate codes for red patches.
Of course, this presupposes that the weights of the features that
make up for the new overlap are strong enough to warrant such
co-activation.
Unwanted Mappings—Nonetheless, creating new overlap is
just one side of the coin. The other side pertains to deleting
old overlap. While selective generation and strengthening of new
overlap aims at facilitating wanted mappings, selective deletion
and weakening of initially given, old overlap aims at impeding
unwanted mappings.
Selective deletion comes into effect under conditions of
unwanted shared features. Under these conditions feature
overlap arises between stimulus and response codes that are not
assigned to each other by instructions, so that their co-activation
may drive wrong, unwanted responses. A typical example
is provided by choice tasks with incompatible assignments
between stimulus and response events. Consider a task in
which tones presented to the left vs. right ear require right
vs. left key presses as responses. In a setting such as this
the two tones will initially share strong spatial features with
the two keys: left and right tones will invite, as it were, left
and right responses. However, since task instructions require
the reverse assignments, these natural, compatible mappings
(left-left and right-right) are in conflict with the required
incompatible mappings (left-right and right-left). Thus, in order
to implement an efficient task set, two complementary measures
must be taken. Initial, natural overlap needs to be weakened
or deleted, and new overlap needs to be generated and
strengthened.
In any case, incompatible assignments must be expected
to yield poorer performance than compatible assignments.
This may rely entirely upon initial overlap, without the
need to weaken or strengthen anything. This is in fact
what numerous studies have shown. Relative to neutral
assignments that exhibit no initial overlap, incompatible
assignments yield slower responses and more errors, whereas
compatible assignments lead to faster responses and fewer
errors (Alluisi and Warm, 1990; Hommel et al., 2001).
Importantly, this is not only true for overlap of spatial and
physical features, but also of semantic and symbolic features
(Stroop, 1935; LeMay and Simon, 1969; Hedge and Marsh,
1975; Simon et al., 1981; Virzi and Egeth, 1985; Prinz,
1990; MacLeod, 1991; Hommel, 1997; van Maanen et al.,
2009). We may, therefore, conclude that our framework is
in line with these basic findings. It accounts for both the
detrimental effects of incompatibility and the beneficial effects
of compatibility.
Conclusion
Event code theory views task sets as event code assemblies in
which event codes from two different sources interact and shape
each other: stimulus codes, generated from external sources and
response codes generated from internal sources. In each trial the
task requires identification of the given stimulus and selection
of the required response. On the one hand, stimulus codes and
response codes compete with each other within their respective
sets, to the effect of weakening and deleting initial code overlap
(horizontal interactions). At the same time particular stimuli
have to be mapped onto particular responses, which requires
cooperation between stimulus and response codes. Selective
strengthening of vertical overlap facilitates wanted assignments,
whereas selective weakening impedes unwanted assignments
(vertical interactions).
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Importantly, these interactions apply to two time scales:
on-line performance and off-line implementation. While
performance-related operations apply to performing the
task (online execution: identification, mapping, selection),
implementation-related operations apply to setting the task
(offline learning: shaping code profiles according to task
demands).
One way of viewing this framework is in terms of attentional
mechanisms. Similarmechanisms have been proposed to account
for selective attention. For instance, the idea of code competition
and selection is widespread in the attentional literature (e.g.,
Logan, 1988, 2002, 2007; Bundesen, 1990, 1998; Desimone
and Duncan, 1995; Schneider, 2013; Rosenbaum, 2014). The
same applies to the notion of codes as feature compounds
whose structure and composition may change on demand
(Barsalou, 1999; Hommel et al., 2001; Memelink and Hommel,
2005, 2006; Hommel, 2010). Yet, while the basic logic is
very much the same, the functional domain is different.
Theories of attention apply these ideas to the domain of
perceptual processing, but our framework applies them to
the broader domain of interactions between perception and
action in task representation. Thus, when viewed from an
attentional perspective, our framework can be seen to deal with
attentional mechanisms operating in task implementation and
performance.
Application to Interference Paradigms
In this section we move on to apply the framework of event
code theory to more complex tasks where the number of stimuli
exceeds the number of responses mapped to them. In a task
scenario such as this the elements of the stimulus set may differ
in features that are irrelevant for response selection. For instance,
when stimuli are color patches that can either be red or green and,
at the same time, either take the shape of a circle or square, the
resulting set of possible stimulus events comprises four elements
that differ on two feature dimensions, namely color and shape.
According to instructions, color may, for instance, be relevant
for response selection (i.e., determine the choice between left and
right key presses), whereas shape may be irrelevant (or vice versa
under reverse instructions).
For a task such as this, our framework leads us to expect
(among other things) that relevant features become strengthened
in the underlying stimulus codes, whereas irrelevant features
become weakened, or even deleted. As a result, response selection
should becomemainly, or even exclusively, controlled by relevant
features. Yet on the other hand, if it appears that irrelevant
features cannot be entirely silenced or deleted, their unwanted
processing may also impact response selection.
The Logic of Interference
Interference paradigms are designed to provoke such impact. In
typical interference tasks stimulus and response codes overlap
with respect to features that take two conflicting roles at a time:
irrelevant elements in stimulus codes (requiring weakening) and
relevant elements in response codes (requiring strengthening).
An example is provided by the Simon task (Simon and Rudell,
1967; Simon, 1968, 1969, 1990; Umiltà and Nicoletti, 1990).
In this task participants are required to select one of two
keys, for instance in response to the color of a stimulus patch
which may appear on the left- or the right-hand side of the
screen. Color is thus a relevant feature of stimulus events,
wheras their location on the screen is entirely irrelevant in the
sense that it should play no role for response selection at all.
Yet on the other hand, the location of the key to be pressed
(mounted on the left- or the right-hand side of the table) is the
crucial distinctive feature in which the two competing actions
differ. The task can therefore be seen to instantiate a conflict
between two roles of a feature: one and the same feature (e.g.,
being located on the right-hand side) is entirely irrelevant for
stimulus identification, but highly relevant, if not indispensable
for response competition.
The pronounced interference effect that is regularly observed
in this task indicates that participants find it in fact impossible
to effectively ignore the location of the color patch. Instead, the
effect thus suggests that the required weakening/deletion of the
irrevant stimulus feature does not occur. It looks as if the strong
role that this feature plays for response selection spills over into
stimulus identification.
This dilemma is illustrated in Figure 4. The upper panels
show a stimulus code and two competing response codes
(e.g., representing a red patch and a left vs. right key press,
respectively). Location features in response codes are highlighted,
reflecting their importance for response competition. Panel
(b) indicates the wanted assignment, indicated by a novel feature
that is shared by the stimulus code and the assigned response
codes (e.g., instantiating the prescription to press the left key in
response to a red patch).
While the upper panels address trials in which the stimulus
is presented in a neutral location, the lower two address
compatible vs. incompatible trials in which stimuli occur
in locations that do or do not correspond to response
locations, respectively. Since location features exhibit high
weights (arising from response competition), they become
automatically (and unavoidably) integrated into pertinent
stimulus codes. This will either strengthen the activation of
the wanted response or induce activation of the competing
unwanted response (in the compatible and the incompatible
case, respectively). Relative to neutral trials, response conflict
is thus reduced on compatible trials and increased on
incompatible trials.
Accordingly, the crucial factor driving the Simon effect
derives from a dilemma inherent in the requirement of forming
efficient task sets. Efficient response competition requires strong
weights for features in which competing responses differ. At the
same time efficient stimulus identification requires weak weights
for features that are irrelevant.
As long as the features to which these conflicting
requirements pertain are different (e.g., stimulus shapes
and response locations), no conflict will arise. However, conflict
will become unavoidable, when they are the same (e.g., stimulus
locations and response locations). Stimulus- and response
codes will then overlap with respect to theses features and the
requirement of strengthening their weights for one code will
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 8 May 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 268
Prinz Framework for task representation
FIGURE 4 | Event code assemblies involved in the Simon task. (A/B)
Control condition (where stimulus location is constant across trials) (A) Initial
assembly of non-intersecting stimulus and response codes (stimulus code S
and two competing response codes, R1 and R2, with location features L/R
highlighted). (B) New overlap between S and R1 instantiates the required
mapping. (C,D) Interference condition (where stimulus location varies across
trials) (C) Compatible trial; stimulus location (L) supports the required
response. (D) Incompatible trial; stimulus location (R) supports the opposite
response. See text for further explanation.
counteract that of weakening their weights for the other code.
In particular, a strong role that a feature plays for the formation
of efficient response codes will automatically strengthen its role
for stimulus code formation, thus preventing it from becoming
weakened or deleted, as optimal task set efficiency would require.
As a result, stimulus identification will interfere with response
selection.
To examine the explanatory power of this simple principle
we now move on to study a variety of interference tasks. The
tasks that are included in our examination differ in two major
respects: mode of response competition and type of overlapping
features. Event code theory posits that these two factors must act
as modulators of task set formation and ensuing performance in
interference paradigms.
A special focus of our examination will consider social
paradigms—that is, paradigms in which a task is shared
between two participants. As will become apparent below, these
paradigms are certainly special in the sense of relying on special
modes of response competition and special types of interfering
features. Nonetheless, our framework can account for them
without introducing any special assumptions. (cf. Dolk and
Prinz, in press; Dolk et al., 2011, 2014a).
Modes of Response Competition
Our framework considers response conflict a crucial driving
force of task set formation and the ensuing competition
a critical constraint of task set structure. Accordingly, we
must expect that the mode of that competition impacts
both; task set formation and task performance. Here
we examine three major types of response conflict and
competition: choice, selective response, and joint selective
response.
Choice tasks require decisions between alternative actions.
For instance, in the case of binary choices on which we
concentrate here, choice tasks require decisions between two
actions that are both explicitly represented. Since one of them
has to be chosen and performed on each given trial, we address
them as Go/Go tasks. In contrast, selective response tasks require
decisions between performing and witholding a single, explicitly
represented action. Since one of these two options has to
be chosen on each given trial, we address them as Go/No-
go tasks. Finally, joint selective response tasks combine two
individuals performing two complementary selective reponse
tasks. In these tasks, too, both individuals have to make
choices between responding vs. withholding. However, since
their choices are complementary, the combined task amounts to
a choice between individuals, that is, which of them responds on
a given trial. Therefore, we may address such tasks as I-go/You-go
tasks.
While choice and selective response tasks are classical tools
of mental chronometry (Donders, 1868/1969; Wirth, 1927), the
joint selective response task is a newcomer to the field (Sebanz
et al., 2003, 2005, 2006). In the following sections we concentrate
on applications of these tasks to interference paradigms,
comparing them in terms of requirements for response
competition and ensuing implications for task implementation
and performance. In this discussion we will mainly focus on the
Simon task as a prototypical interference paradigm and a testcase
for examination and comparison.
Choices: Go/Go Tasks
Classical interference tasks are choice tasks, instantiating
competition among a set of responses mapped to a set of stimuli.
Here we may confine ourselves to summarizing previously
discussed topics from ealier sections. As we have seen, a typical
Simon task requires selecting and pushing one of two keys
in response to the color, for example, of a stimulus patch on
the screen. Interference may then arise from overlap between
features of required responses (e.g., left or right key presses)
and irrelevant features of presented stimuli (e.g., left or right
on screen). Since the overlap supports correct/wanted responses
on compatible trials, but incorrect/unwanted responses on
incompatible trials, it facilitates and impedes response selection
accordingly. The resulting performance difference produces the
Simon effect.
Choice interference tasks thus instantiate the above-
mentioned dilemma between the efficiency requirements of
stimulus and response code formation. Features that must play a
strong role in one kind of code cannot be weak or even absent in
the other. Given the structure of choice tasks, there is no obvious
way to resolve the dilemma. This may in fact account for the
remarkable persistence of the interference effect in such tasks
(MacLeod and Dunbar, 1988; MacLeod, 1991; van Maanen et al.,
2009).
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Selective Responses: Go/No-go Tasks
Let us now see what our framework predicts when we alter
the requirements of response competition. Consider a Go/No-
go version of the Simon task in which participants again
respond to one of the two colors (say, red), but withhold
responding to the other color (say, green). In a setting like
this the stimulus set comprises the same four combinations of
(task-relevant) colors and (task-irrelevant) locations as before.
In contrast, the structure of the response set is entirely
different. Each trial requires a decision between two options: to
push or not push the response key. Conflict and competition
thus apply to the options Go vs. No-go, that is responding
vs. withholding response. Recent evidence has shown that
processing mechanisms for withholding are closely related to
those for responding, so that withholding a response can also
be regarded as a response (Kühn et al., 2009; Kühn and Brass,
2010). If one adopts this view, the Go/No-go task may still be
seen to instantiate a conflict between two competing response
options. Yet, the two options are not spatially distinct anymore:
they do not differ in terms of spatial locations to which they
pertain.
Our framework predicts that the Simon effect must
disappear under these conditions. Since there is no response
competition that highlights location features anymore, there is
no strengthening of feature weights and, hence, no mandatory
inclusion of location features in pertinent stimulus codes.
Instead, these features can now be weakened or deleted, as
the instruction to ignore them suggests. This is in fact what
severalstudies have shown: the Simon effect is abolished in
the Go/No-go task (e.g., Hommel, 1996; Ansorge and Wühr,
2004).
At this point we may tentatively conclude that event code
theory offers a framework that helps us to understand the
functional difference between Go/Go and Go/No-go versions of
the Simon task. More specifically we may conclude that the mode
of response competion inherent in these versions drives task set
formation and determines task set structure.
Joint Selective Responses: I-go/You-go Tasks
Can the framework likewise account for performance in the
joint selective response task? Before we address this question,
let us first see what the task requires and how it works. The
literature offers two basic accounts to capture the functional
logic of the task: individual and social. They differ not only
in descriptive terms, but also suggest different explanations
that are associated with fairly diverging theoretical backgrounds
(Dolk and Prinz, in press; Wenke et al., 2011; Dolk et al.,
2014a).
Individual account—According to the individual account, the
task combines two participants who are required to perform
two independent, complementary Go/No-go tasks. Typically, the
two are seated next to each other, with one of two response
keys assigned to each of them. Instructions may require, for
instance, that one responds to green, but withholds to red stimuli
whereas the other does the reverse, that is, responds to red, but
withholds to green stimuli. Each participant’s share of the task
is thus, in terms of task requirements, completely equivalent to
the regular, single Go/No-go task as discussed above. In other
words, for each of them response competition is competing
between the options of pushing or not pushing one and the
same response key. Accordingly, the individual perspective leads
us to expect that the joint selective response setting should
exhibit similar interference effects as the regular, single Go/No-
go setting.
Social account—The social account takes a broader
perspective. Essentially, it regards the two individual Go/No-go
tasks as two complementary components of a common Go/Go
task that is shared between two individuals. Within this common
task each of the two paricipants is responsible for one of the two
stimulus colors and one of the two response keys assigned to
them. Since stimulus color dictates which of the two response
keys must be pushed, the full task is seen to instantiate conflict
and competition between two spatially distinct response options.
Accordingly, the social perspective leads us to expect that the
joint selective response setting should exhibit similar interference
effects as the regular, single Go/Go setting.
As indicated, the two accounts are rooted in quite divergent
theoretical and metatheoretical backgrounds (cf. Prinz, 2012,
Ch. 2). In particular, they differ deeply in terms of their
implied beliefs regarding the nature and representational basis
of human sociality. The individual account believes in solipsistic
closure. It regards human agents as closed, encapsulated systems
that, when brought into social scenarios, tend to concentrate
on their own agenda, without taking much notice of others
or even coordinating or sharing their agendas with them.
In contrast, the social account believes in open-mindedness.
It regards agents as open, interactive systems that, when
brought into social scenarios, are keen on taking notice of
others and opening their own agenda for coordinating and
sharing it with them. Sociality is thus a primary, constitutive
ingredient of human nature for the social account, while
it plays only a secondary, derived role for the individual
account.
Combined account—Setting such big issues aside, we now take
a more pragmatic look at the joint task from the perspective
of event code theory. This framework suggests an account that
combines individual and social elements (Baess and Prinz, in
prep.; Dolk and Prinz, in press; Wenke et al., 2011; Dolk et al.,
2014a).
The combined account once more builds up on response
conflict and competition as the key factor driving task set
formation and shaping task set structure. It combines two
elements, What and Who (Jeannerod, 1999, 2003, 2006; Decety
and Chaminade, 2003). On the one hand, it claims that response
competition takes the form of a What-conflict: in each trial
participants decide between responding and withholding—as the
individual account suggests. On the other hand, it claims that
the What-conflict is superimposed by a Who-conflict, that is, a
conflict between the two agents—as the social account suggests.
The interindividual conflict becomes particularly apparent
when we focus on overt responses. When viewed in terms of
overt events, trials can be seen to instantiate choices between
the responding agents: either I respond or You respond. For
each participant, though, this interindividual conflict is perfectly
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correlated, and hence completely confounded with the individual
Go/No-go conflict: when I go You withhold, and when You
go I withhold. The task thus conflates two modes of response
competition: individual selective response and interindividual
choice. This is why we may refer to it as an I-go/You-go task.
Under such conditions predictions of task performance are
difficult to make. Basically, wemust expect that task performance
exhibits signatures of both modes of response competition.
Mixed evidence along these lines is indeed what studies of the
joint selective response task show (cf. Dolk and Prinz, in press).
On the one hand, there is strong evidence in support of
the claim that the joint task is, in functional terms, still a
selective response task, not a choice task. This conclusion is
suggested by comparisons of response speed. As is known
since Donders’ pioneering studies, response times for choices
are substantially longer than for selective responses. The
difference may range in the order of up to 200 ms—in
fact a gigantic amount of time in terms of the standards of
mental chronometry. Given this background, the observation
of joint selective responses being substantially faster than
choices and exhibiting the same time regime as regular selective
reponses, seems to suggest that the embedding of Go/No-
go tasks in joint settings does not alter the workings of
the underlying task set machinery in a fundamental way. It
would appear that joint selective responses are processed in
the same way as regular selective responses, unlike choice
responses.
On the other hand, evidence also exists in support of the claim
that the joint task must be regarded as a choice task. This is
because a Simon effect is regularly observed in this task. The
size of the effect is weaker than in classical choice tasks, but
it is highly reliable (Sebanz et al., 2003, 2005, 2006). We may
therefore conclude that interference arises in the joint, but not
in the regular version of the selective response task. This seems
to indicate that individual task set formation becomes modulated
by social context.
Our framework can readily account for these observations and
conclusions. The central claim is that social context acts to shape
response code assemblies, which then act back on stimulus code
assemblies and interactions between the two.
The critical contribution that social context makes in
shaping competing responses comes from integrating new
distinctive features. In the joint task such new features can
be derived from the fact that the two competing responses
are distributed between two agents who differ from each
other in several respects. Accordingly, any feature in which
the agents and/or their responses differ is now a candidate
for becoming included in their respective response codes. The
joint task thus offers new distinctive features for inclusion
in response codes—features that do not exist in the regular
individual task.
Location features provide an obvious example. When two
agents share a Simon task, they are seated on two chairs
next to each other in front of the screen. They are, in
other words, distinguished by their spatial locations in the
scenario. Relative to the other, one is the left and the other
the right agent. Accordingly, these features offer themselves
for inclusion in the competing response codes. If this happens
they will, on the one hand, increase code distinctiveness and
improve the efficiency of response selection (as illustrated in
Figure 2E). However, if they overlap with irrelevant stimulus
features, they will also give rise to interference (as illustrated
in Figures 4C,D), resulting in a (albeit weak) Simon effect.
Here we return to the dilemma inherent in interference
tasks: interference is the consequence of the same feature
requiring inclusion in response codes and deletion from stimulus
codes.
Looking back, we can now specify more precisely the way
in which the combined account integrates individual and social
elements. There are two basic claims. The first is that individuals
concentrate on representing their own share of the task, without
representing the other agent’s share. This is the individual
element. The second is that they still form representations of
agents and actions involved in the task scenario, exploiting them
for shaping and optimizing their own task sets. This is the social
element (Dolk and Prinz, in press; Dolk et al., 2014a).
In sum, the combined account does not believe in the
romantic idea of task co-representation, claiming that agents
share common representations of the full task in which they
participate. The combined account posits shaping rather than
sharing task sets. This notion reflects the pragmatic idea that
representations of co-actors and their actions help agents to
shape representations of their own task (Dolk and Prinz, in
press).
Types of Overlapping Features
Up to this point we have treated interference paradigms as a
uniform category and discussed the Simon task as a prototypical
example. Yet, when we consider a broader range of tasks, we
need to extend our framework to account for different types
of overlapping features and patterns of interference effects
associated with them.
More specifically, we may discern three major paradigms
that differ in terms of the stimulus-related features whose
overlap with response-related features gives rise to interference:
the Simon task (where overlap pertains to spatial locations),
the Eriksen flanker task (where it pertains to categorical
assignments), and a face perception task (where it pertains to
personal identities).
Locations
Since we have used the Simon task as a testbed for
applying event code theory to interference paradigms, we
may start summarizing what has been discussed hitherto
concerning spatial interference effects. Interference in the
Choice version of this task arises from overlap between spatial
features associated with stimuli and responses (i.e., left vs.
right locations). This overlap acts to facilitate and impede
response selection on in compatible and incompatible trials,
respectively. The resulting difference produces the Simon
effect.
In the following, we focus on Selective Responses. Firstly, we
discuss fundamental mechanisms of spatial interference. Here
we consider both, Individual and Joint Selective Response tasks.
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Secondly, we go beyond basicmechanism, focusing on the impact
of Social Modulators on spatial interference.
Individual selective responses: Go/No-go—As we have seen
the interference effect disappears in the Individual Selective
Response version of the Simon task. Our framework offers a
simple explanation for this observation, based on the fact that
in Go/No-go task response conflict applies to options that do
not differ in terms of spatial locations (viz., pushing vs. not
pushing a given response key). Thus, since response codes do not
carry location features, overlap between stimulus and response
locations cannot emerge, and spatial interference effects cannot
be obtained.
This view claims that the crucial difference between Choice
and Selective Response lies in different roles of spatial response
features. These features play a strong role in Choice, but no role
at all in Selective Response. An obvious way of testing this claim
is to run a Go/No-go task scenario where spatial layout gives rise
to localizing the involved response key and/or the act of pushing
it on a left-right dimension. This should furnish the underlying
response code with corresponding location features.
One way of achieving this is to introduce an accessory
reference object or event and integrate it into the spatial layout
of the task scenario. If the object or event is sufficiently salient,
it should act as a reference for localizing the key press on the
left/right dimension, thus furnishing the underlying response
code with a location feature pertaining to that dimension. The
accessory reference is thus expected to play a similar role
for Selective Responses as the competing response does for
Choices: to lay the ground for referential coding of response
locations and feature overlap and interference arising from such
coding.
This prediction has been confirmed in recent studies. Dolk
et al. (2011) showed that a Simon effect in aGo/No-go task cannot
only be obtained when a co-actor is introduced (i.e., under Joint
Go/No-go conditions; see below), but also when, instead of their
co-actor’s response key, another salient object (e.g., a Japanese
waving cat or a ticking metronome) is mounted on the left- or
right-hand side of the participant’s response key (Dolk et al.,
2013; see also Dolk et al., 2011). These studies demonstrate that
any attention-capturing object may serve the function of a spatial
reference for furnishing response keys with location features.
These findings support the idea of whether spatial interference
is obtained in the Selective Response task and whether it is
determined by the spatial layout of the task scenario. If the
scenario harbors a salient reference, participants will localize
their responses accordingly, thus furnishing their response codes
with location features. Once established, location features in
response codes will give rise to spatial interference, due to their
overlap with location features in stimulus codes.
Joint selective responses: I-go/You-go—The scope of this
explanatory approach is evidently not restricted to the individual
task. It can also be applied to the Joint Go/No-go task. In fact it
was initially conceived to account for the Joint task and only then
tested on the Individual task (e.g., Guagnano et al., 2010; Dolk
et al., 2011).
Essentially, this approach treats actors, co-actors and actions
as physical objects and events that are specified by their locations
in the spatial layout of the task scenario. More specifically, the
claim is that the co-actor and/or his response serve as a reference
for localizing the actor and/or her own response—provided that
the co-actor’s involvement in the task is sufficiently salient.
For instance, it has been shown that interference is obtained
when the co-actor is actively involved in the task, not when
he/she is passively sitting by the actor’s side (Sebanz et al.,
2005, 2006). Likewise, interference seems to depend on distance
of the reference: a Simon effect only obtaines when the co-
actor is seated close-by, not when he/she is seated at a distance
(Guagnano et al., 2010).
Referential coding can thus account for the emergence
of interference in the Joint Go/No-go task. However we
should realize that the notion of referential coding is grossly
underspecified. For instance, we are unclear as to which objects
and events qualify as references. There are several candidate
items, such as response keys and their sounds, arms, hands and
fingers as they operate response keys, torsos to which these limbs
are attached, and seats carrying them etc.
Under normal conditions the relative locations of these items
are perfectly correlated: a response key on the left is operated by
a hand on the left, which is, in turn, attached to a torso on the
left, etc. Still, we have limited knowledge as to their respective
contributions to spatial coding; does location coding mainly
pertain to response devices—or to agents and their bodies? First
evidence seems to suggest that efficient location coding may in
fact involve both, keys and seats at the same time (Dittrich et al.,
2013).
Social modulators—So far we have concentrated on co-
actors and their actions as physical objects and events.
Yet, the combined approach outlined above adopts a more
comprehensive view that goes beyond the physical domain. As
have seen, this approach posits that the What-conflict between
Go andNo-go is in the Joint task superimposed by aWho-conflict
between I and You. Accordingly, it predicts a critical role for
what we may call Self/Other overlap: any features in which the
two agents differ or overlap can be expected to play a functional
role in resolving the combined I-go/You-go conflict.
According to this view, spatial location is just one such
distinctive feature. Beyond their accidental seating in the
experimental scenario, the two agents will also differ in a number
of non-spatial and non-physical respects, be it in terms of
transient states or permanent traits. Thus, when two individuals
meet to engage in a joint task, they will immediately form
impressions about each other, including intuitions concerning
Self/Other overlap. These intuitions will adress both, features that
are common to them (e.g., female, German, tall) and features that
distinguish them (e.g., dressed in black vs. white, speaking with
Bavarian vs. Saxonian accent, friendly vs. unfriendly behavior,
etc.).
Taking this into account, their seating in the experimental
scenario does no more than add one particular transient state
to that list, viz. sitting left vs. right of the other. Even if we
assume that such spatial features are coded automatically, their
contribution to the formation of pertinent response codes are
likely to depend on their relative role in the total list of distinctive
features instantiating Self/Other overlap. The shorter the list, the
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stronger their contribution will be, and vice versa: When the two
agents resemble each other inmany respects, the list of distinctive
features will be short, so that the added value of distinctive
location features will be substantial. Conversely, when the agents
differ in many respects, the list will be long, so that the added
value of distinctive location features can only be marginal.
Accordingly, the framework predicts that agent similarity,
or Self/Other overlap, must modulate spatial interference in
the Joint Selective Response task. This prediction was recently
confirmed in several studies. One line of evidence stems from
studies combining in-group and out-group members in the
Joint task. Here it was shown that a Simon effect is obtained
when two (mutually similar) in-group members interact, but
not when two (dissimilar) outgroup members interact (Müller
et al., 2011). A further line of evidence pertains to the role of
interpersonal relationships. Factors such as positive mood and
positive relationships between co-acting individuals are known
to increase perceived self-other overlap (e.g., Davis et al., 1996; cf.
Heider, 1958). As we must therefore expect, such factors also act
to increase spatial interference in the Joint task (Hommel et al.,
2009; Kuhbandner et al., 2010).
As a concluding remark it should be noted that social
modulation of spatial interference is also predicted by the co-
representation account. The claim here is that individuals are
more prone and/or more efficient in sharing common task
representations with similar as compared to dissimilar others. In
contrast, our framework relies entirely on shaping individual task
representations according to the requirements emerging from
spatial and social characteristics of the task scenario.
Assignments
It is sometimes argued that interference in the Simon task may
be special because spatial features may play a privileged role
in sensorimotor processing which may perhaps be hardware-
rooted. For instance onemay argue that spatial interference arises
from physical features whose coding requires no more than just
discriminating between two well-separated locations of stimulus
and response events.
In contrast, semantic interference relies on arbitrary
categorical assignments. The Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen
and Eriksen, 1974; Eriksen, 1995) provides a paradigm for the
study of interference arising from short-lived stimulus-response
assignments. In the flanker task participants respond to two
(or more) targets (e.g., letters, shapes, etc.) by pressing one
of two response keys. Targets are surrounded by distracting
flankers that are either (1) the same as the target (identical trials);
(2) perceptually different from the target, but assigned to the
same response (compatible trials); (3) perceptually different
and assigned to the competing opposite response (incompatible
trials); or (4) perceptually different and not assigned to any
response (neutral trials).
To illustrate, we may refer to a study by Atmaca et al. (2011).
In their experiments a string of five letters were presented in
each trial: a target in the center, surrounded by four identical
flankers (two on either side). In a given trial, one of four
letters could appear in the target position: H and K (assigned
to one of two response keys) and S and C (assigned to the
opposite key). As an example for explaining the four task
conditions, we may consider trials on which letter H served
as target. In identical trials the same letter also served for
flankers (yielding HHHHH), whereas in neutral trials the same
function was served by a letter that was never used as target
(and therefore never assigned to a response key, e.g., UUHUU).
These two conditions were considered control conditions.
Experimental conditions were provided by compatible and
incompatible trials. In compatible trials flankers were physically
different from the target but assigned to the same response
category (yielding KKHKK), wheras in incompatible trials they
were both physically and categorically different (yielding, e.g.,
SSHSS).
As with the Simon task this paradigm has generated a large
amount of literature pertaining to various task versions and
research questions. (cf., e.g., Eriksen, 1995; Purmann et al., 2011;
Davelaar, 2013). The common finding is that flanker-related
processing interferes with target-related processing, and that it
does so despite the fact that task instructions advise ignoring
flankers altogether.
Firstly, and perhaps not too surprisingly, response times for
target categorization are substantially shorter in identical than
in neutral trials, indicating that identical flankers may facilitate
target processing. Secondly, and perhaps more interestingly,
response times in compatible trials are often faster than in
neutral trials, indicating that interferencemay not only arise from
physical features but also from semantic, categorical features.
Thirdly, and even more interestingly, responses are usually much
slower in incompatible than in neutral trials, supporting and
strengthening the same conclusion.
Unfortunately, contrasts involving the so-called neutral
condition are less conclusive than this brief summary suggests.
This is because two factors are confounded in such contrasts:
assignment and valence. The assignment factor refers to the
functional contrast of interest here: flankers may be assigned
or not assigned to a response. The valence factor refers to
a different functional contrast: flankers may be bivalent or
univalent. Assigned flankers are always bivalent, that is, they can
occur in the task in both roles; flankers and targets. Conversely,
unassigned flankers are univalent, that is, they can only occur
as flankers throughout the task. Thus, since univalent flankers
are certainly easier to ignore than bivalent flankers, neutral
trials cannot be expected to deliver a truly neutral reference
for compatible and incompatible trials. This is in fact in line
with results from most experiments: responses in so-called
neutral trials are often as fast as in compatible trials, or even
faster.
As with the Simon task we must therefore concentrate on
the net compatibility effect, i.e., the contrast between compatible
and incompatible trials. This contrast adresses assignments,
unconfounded with valences. The sole difference between
compatible and incompatible trials pertains to the response
category to which the flankers in the string are assigned. In
the compatible case both target and flankers drive wanted
responses. Conversely, in the incompatible case the target and
flankers drive wanted and unwanted responses, respectively. As
a result, interference obtains: relative to the compatible case,
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response conflict is stronger in the incompatible case, weakening
performance accordingly.
Flanker interference is grounded on semantic
features—semantic in the sense of instantiating arbitrary
assignments between stimulus letters and response keys.
Notably, these assignments are acquired within the task. It is
only by following instructions that participants learn that H and
K belong to one response category and S and C to the other.
In this respect semantic interference is indeed fundamentally
different from spatial interference. While spatial interference
relies on overlap between physical features that are inherent
in the task layout, semantic interference relies on arbitrary
stimulus-response assignments that are only established by task
instructions. Thus, unlike spatial features that can be derived
from overt perception of the task layout, semantic features must
be derived from covert knowledge of task-specific assignments.
Our framework offers a simple and convenient way
of conceiving the representational underpinnings of that
knowledge. The underlying assumption is that new assignments
are instantiated through new features. According to this view,
implementing new assignments into a task set is tantamount to
creating a novel feature that forms part of both, the stimulus code
and the response code assigned to it (cf. Figures 2B, 3B). This
feature then instantiates the wanted assignment. It instantiates
both, the prescriptive assignment that the stimulus must be
followed by the response and the descriptive assignment that the
response may be linked to the stimulus.
Such features stand for the assignment as such: these are what
they represent and what they mean. Their functional significance
for the task set will then depend on the relative weights that
they attain in the feature compounds that make up stimulus and
response codes. The flanker task suggests that verbal instructions
can drive their weights to a level strong enough to give rise to
substantial interference effects.
Individual selective responses: Go/No-go—As seen above, the
transition from Go/Go to Go/No-go is in the Simon task
associated with a loss of response-related location features. The
loss is critical since spatial interference builds on such features.
However, in the flanker task we are facing a different functional
situation. In this task semantic assignment features become
partially lost and partially preserved on that transition. For
instance, when instructions require responding to H and K and
withholding response to any other target, the assignment of H
and K to the response key is preserved, whereas any other letter-
key-assignments are lost. Unlike key-related location features,
key-related assignments do not require the opposite key as a
reference. Thus, when the opposite key is removed, the remaining
key looses its location, but not its assignment.
As a result we must expect to see a positive, not a negative
compatibility effect in the Go/No-go task. There can be no
negative effect as there is no longer any functional difference
between neutral and incompatible trials: incompatible trials
(such as SSHSS orCCKCC) are, in functional terms, neutral trials.
Conversely, the positive effect must be preserved as the covert
assignment knowledge on which it relies is unaffected.
In practice, however, the above-mentioned confound forces
us to concentrate on the net compatibility effect, that is, the
contrast between compatible and incompatible trials. With
respect to this contrast we must expect that a compatibility effect
should still be obtained. This is because flankers contribute to
driving the Go response on compatible, but not on incompatible
trials. This prediction is confirmed by task performance data
(e.g., Atmaca et al., 2011, Experiments 1 and 3).
A further prediction is that the compatibility effect must
depend on prior experience with other versions of the task.
For instance, when participants perform a Go/No-go task after
performing other task versions in which incompatible flankers
were assigned to overt responses, they may be expected to carry
over these previously acquired assignments to the new task. An
example is provided by Experiment 3 in the study byAtmaca et al.
(2011), in which the Go/No-go task could be administered either
before or after a different version of the task in which the same
incompatible flankers were assigned to response keys. While
interference was otained in both conditions, it was modulated
by previously acquired assignments. The compatibility effect in a
current Go/No-go task increased substantially when assignments
acquired in a preceding task could be carried over to the
current task.
In sum, these observations suggest that, unlike the Simon
task, some interference is preserved when we move from choices
to selective responses. This difference in performance reflects a
difference in the features that give rise to interference. While
spatial features anchored in the overt task layout are lost in
this way, semantic features anchored in covert knowledge are
preserved.
Joint selective response: I-go/You-go—For this task the
combined account claims that the individual conflict between
responding and withholding (Go/No-go) is superimposed by a
social conflict between the two responding agents (I/You). Agents
may differ inmanyways. As we have seen, crucial features driving
the joint Simon effect pertain to co-actors’ spatial locations. Their
overlap with corresponding stimulus features gives rise to spatial
interference.
In the flanker task the agents also differ in terms of spatial
locations, although in this task there is no overlap between
stimulus and response locations. Instead, overlap now applies
to flanker assignments. In compatible and incompatible trials
flankers are assigned to I and You, respectively. While the
assignment of compatible flankers to oneself also applies to the
individual task, the assignment of incompatible flankers to one’s
co-actor is only established in the joint task. As a result, flanker
interference must be expected to increase in the joint task. As in
the individual task, compatible flankers must be expected to help,
but atop of this incompatible flankers must also be expected to
hurt now.
Experimental evidence confirms this prediction. Net flanker
interference is always higher in Joint Go/No-go tasks than in
Individual Go/No-go tasks (Atmaca et al., 2011). Remarkably,
this applies to both; tasks involving human and non-human co-
actors, suggesting that flankers may not only become assigned
to real agents who perform the task, but also to non-performing
pseudo-agents (Dolk et al., 2014b). Taken together, the evidence
from these studies supports the claim that in the Joint task
intraindividual conflict between responding and withholding
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becomes correlated and conflated with interindividual conflict
between onself and one’s co-actor.
Identities
As a final example we consider a paradigm for the study
of interference arising from irrelevant face information (Baess
and Prinz, in prep.; see also Philipp and Prinz, 2010). The
task required Go/No-go decisions, dependent on the color of
circles presented on the screen (e.g., Go for white and No-go
for black circles, or vice versa). The circles were superimposed
on background faces whose identity were irrelevant for task
and therefore had to be ignored. Nonetheless, the critical
manipulation pertained to the identity of the irrelevant faces on
which the relevant circles were superimposed. Three kinds of
trials were randomly intermixed, varying in the identity of the
background face and instantiating different degrees of face/agent
overlap: own face, familiar face and neutral face. In own-face trials
circles were superimposed onto a photo showing the face of the
responding agent. In familiar-face trials they were superimposed
onto photos showing familiar individuals such as co-actors,
friends or siblings. Neutral-face trials showed entirely unfamiliar
faces for control.
Individual selective responses: Go/No-go—In this study a
reliable own-face advantage was obtained throughout: Go
responses on own-face trials were always faster than in neutral-
face trials. Results for familiar faces depended on the depth
of familiarity. When photos showed faces of deeply familiar
individuals such as siblings or friends, a familiarity advantage
was obtained. In this caseGo responses for familiar faces were just
as fast as for own faces. No such advantage was obtained when
photos showed faces of superficially familiar individuals such as
experimental co-actors. In this case, Go responses were just as
slow as for neutral faces.
To account for the own-face advantage, we need to address the
question of what kinds of features faces and Go/No-go responses
have in common and what own faces have that neutral, foreign
faces don’t have. One kind of such features pertains to personal
identity. On the stimulus side, the role of identity features is fairly
obvious: more than any other body part a person’s face bears the
signature of his/her identity. Moreover, since faces are salient
pop-out stimuli that are hard to ignore, we may assume that
features pertaining to facial identity are automatically processed
in this task.
The role of these features is perhaps less obvious on the
response side. However, the conflict between responding vs.
withholding is conflated with an asymmetry in terms of agent
identity. Go responses are overt actions that require an agent
performing them: when there is an overt action theremust also be
an agent. Response codes forGo responses must therefore specify
both, the action (What) and the agent performing it (Who).
Conversely, No-go responses do not imply any overt actions that
require an agent performing them: when there is no overt action
there can be no agent either. Response codes for No-go responses
can therefore neither specify the action nor the agent.
This asymmetry may explain why Go responses are faster
on own-face trials than in neutral-face trials. When the
photo shows one’s own face, the identity of the responding
agent (as specified by the response code) overlaps with the
identity of the stimulus face (as specified by the stimulus
code). No such overlap applies when the photo shows a
neutral face. This functional difference may give rise to
the own-face advantage. Its phenomenal counterpart is the
intuition in which pictures of participants’ own face entail
action impulses that pictures of neutral faces don’t: for
them, it is as if seeing their own face prompts their own
action.
A related, though more formal type of features that stimulus
faces may share withGo/No-go responses pertains to dimensional
polarity. The Go/No-go dimension is unipolar in the sense that
one response option is well defined (positive polarity: push the
key in front of you), whereas the other is defined by default
(negative polarity: do nothing). The same applies to the face
dimension: one’s own face is singular and well defined, whereas
other faces are defined by default. As a result, the positive
polarity of one’s own face matches the positive polarity of the Go
response. Such polarity correspondence may likewise contribute
to the own-face advantage (Seymour, 1971; Proctor et al., 1992;
Proctor and Cho, 2006).
To account for the familiarity advantage we may again
resort to overlap of identity features. If it is true that response
codes for Go responses address both, the overt action and
oneself as responding agent, we should not be surprised to see
that overlap between face and agent identity is not an all-or-
none affair, but may be graded according to the social and
semantic distance between the face on the screen and oneself
as responding agent. Deep familiarity that relies on long-term
acquaintance (e.g., siblings or friends) seems to create strong
overlap—being no weaker than familiarity with one’s own face.
In contrast, superficial familiarity that builds on short-term
acquaintance (e.g., experimental co-actors first encountered a
few minutes before) seems to be insufficient in creating any
overlap at all.
Taken together, the results suggest considering own-face
advantage as a special case of familiarity advantage. In this
paradigm interference arises from overlap between identities
of stimulus faces and responding agents, and the features
instantiating them in stimulus and response codes. Interference
in the face task thus relies on features whose assignment to
stimulus and response codes builds on previously acquired
knowledge. This explains why interference is obtained in
the Individual Go/No-go task: critical features are derived
from internal, knowledge-based resources, not from external,
stimulus-based resources (as in the Eriksen task, but unlike the
Simon task).
Joint selective responses: I-go/You-go—Finally, when we move
from the individual to the joint version of the Go/No-go task,
agent asymmetry (I vs.No-one) becomes agent competition (I vs.
You). Agent competition should support agent differentiation,
that is, increase weights of distinctive features for the identities
of the two competing agents. Since these response-related
identity features overlap with stimulus-induced identity features,
the basic prediction is that identity-based interference should
increase when one moves from the individual to joint Go/No-
go task.
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In the study by Baess and Prinz (in prep.) the evidence in
support of this prediction was mixed. An increase of own-face
advantage was in fact obtained when the joint task was shared
with a hitherto unknown co-actor. However, no such increase
was obtained when the task was shared with a sibling or friend.
In other words, the prediction was confirmed under conditions
of shallow, but not deep familiarity.
To account for this surprising finding, the authors suggested
resorting to the role of familiarity for Self/Other overlap
(Baess and Prinz, in prep.). When actors and co-actors
are closely related to each other (i.e., siblings or friends),
their representations of themselves and of their co-actors
will strongly overlap. Due to this overlap a photo of their
own face will not only prime their own Go response, but
also their co-actor’s Go response to some degree (hence,
their own No-go response conflated with it). As shown in
Figure 5, (horizontal) self/other overlap must thus be expected
to modulate the efficiency of priming arising from (vertical)
face/agent overlap. Critically, these two factors have opposite
effects on response competition. On one hand, response
competition decreases as face/agent overlap increases, but on
the other hand it increases as self/other overlap increases.
The speed of the Go response must therefore reflect the
combined effect of two counteracting factors that may cancel
each other.
At first glance, this finding and the account offered for it seem
to be at variance with observations and explanations discussed in
the above-mentioned studies on the role of self/other overlap in
the joint Simon task. As reported, agent overlap in these studies
was always correlated positively with interference. This would
lead one to expect strong interference for siblings and friends
(where self/other overlap must be fairly strong), but weak or no
interference for unknown co-actors (where agent overlap must
be much weaker).
A closer look reveals that there is no contradiction at all,
however. This is because differences in agent overlap must
be associated with differences in the relative contributions
of response- vs. agent-related features to the combined
FIGURE 5 | Interaction between (vertical) face/agent and (horizontal)
self/other overlap. Due to vertical overlap between stimulus and response
codes, a photo of one’s own face (OF ) primes one’s own Go response (I-go).
As long as horizontal overlap between response codes is weak the competing
code (You-go) is unaffected by the vertical overlap (panel A, unfamiliar
co-actors). However, when horizontal overlap is substantial, one’s own face
will also prime the competing code (You-go; panel B, familiar co-actors).
response/agent codes. More specifically, an increase in agent
overlap must be expected to weaken the weights of agent-related
features, to the effect of strengthening the relative weights of
response-related features. Such restructuring of feature weights
must lead to different consequences for the Simon task and
the face/agent interference task. Since Simon interference relies
on overlap between stimulus and response-related features,
strengthening the role of response-related features must lead to
stronger interference. Conversely, since face/agent interference
relies on overlap between stimulus and agent-related features,
weakening the role of agent-related features must lead to weaker
interference. This is why the finding regarding the role of
self/other overlap in the face/agent interference task is entirely
compatible with seemingly conflicting findings concerning its
role in the Simon task.
Conclusion
Event code theory claims that interference arises in tasks in which
the same features adopt two roles at a time: that of irrelevant
elements in stimulus codes and that of relevant elements in
response codes. In this case conflict becomes unavoidable. Since
stimulus and response codes overlap in these features, the
requirement of strengthening feature weights for one code must
counteract the requirement of weakening them for the other. In
particular, must a strong role that features gain from processing
irrelevant stimulus information counteract their suppression
for efficient response selection? This is the dilemma on which
interference builds.
In this section we applied this principle to a variety of
interference paradigms, including joint tasks that are shared
between two participants. In one aspect, since our framework
considers response competition the chief driver of interference,
different modes of such competition must give rise to differnt
patterns of interference. However, since it also claims a crucial
role for features in which stimulus and response codes overlap,
different kinds of such features must likewise be associated with
different patterns of interference.
Concerning the role of social context for task set formation,
two major observations have emerged, one of which pertains
to response competition. Task sets for shared tasks seem to
instantiate a special mode of response competition in which an
intraindividual conflict between responding and withholding is
conflated with an interindividual conflict between the two agents,
yielding an I-go/You-go conflict. The other observation pertains
to the nature of features whose overlap gives rise to interference.
Such features may, in some paradigms, refer to basic elements
for example, key locations, body parts and body movements.
However, in other (if not all) social paradigms they also refer
to the agents themselves—both physically (e.g., being seated
alongside each other) and non-physically (e.g., being related to
each other as siblings or aquainted as friends).
Taken together, the two observations suggest a prominent role
of agent-related features for task set formation in social context.
When a task assigns competing actions to competing agents, task
set formation will adress both actions and agents. As a result,
response codes will include features refering to the agents who
respond, not just the actions through which they respond.
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The Benefits of Matching
As discussed above, the notion of matching plays a key role in
the Event Code Theory of task set formation. Unlike mapping
operations, which are thought to rely on extrinsic, arbitrary
linkages, matching operations are thought to rely on intrinsic,
content-based interactions between stimulus and response codes.
This raises the issue of how mapping and matching are related.
There are two seemingly contradictory answers to this
question, one at the level of representing world events through
mind codes, and the other at the level of formation of these codes
from elementary features.
The answer at the representational level invokes mapping-
through-matching. This principle claims that incommensurate
objects can become represented by commensurate codes in
the mind, so that code similarity, or overlap plays a role in
their interaction. In line with this idea, our framework claims
that S-R mappings are instantiated through creating selective
overlap between stimulus and response codes (as illustrated
in Figures 2B,C, 3B, 4B). Once implemented, the overlap
mediates interactions between stimulus and response codes in
performance. It thus accounts for arbitrary relationships between
incommensurate events (e.g., stimulus colors and response keys)
through similarity relationships beween their commensurate
event codes.
The concept that objects and events that are coupled
to each other may be represented by codes whose overlap
indicates their coupling, has recently gained support from
fMRI studies addressing the shaping of cortical representations
through temporal regularities. Results showed that several brain
areas encoded regular couplings between objects and events
through increasing the overlap of their cortical representations
(Schapiro et al., 2012, 2013). These findings suggest a functional
role for representational similarity: couplings between objects
and events become instantiated through overlap between their
representations. Our framework claims that the same principle
holds for the coupling of stimuli and responses in task sets.
Mapping-through-matching holds for represention of events
in the world through codes in the mind/brain. In contrast,
the reverse principle seems to hold for the formation of event
codes from features. At this level matching-through-mapping
applies. Event codes build on local feature compounds that rely
on arbitrary mappings of selected features (e.g., their selective
inclusion/exclusion or their selective strengthening/weakening
of their weights in these compounds). Therefore, networks of
arbitrary mappings are required at the feature level to enable
similarity-basedmatchings at the code level. High-level matching
depends on a powerful machinery for low-level mapping (Prinz,
1984, 1987, 2013; Catmur et al., 2007; Heyes, 2010; Pulvermüller
et al., 2014).
This raises the issue of what the functional benefits of
matching may be, that is, what matching can do for cognitive
systems that mapping cannot—a question reminiscent of the
classical debate of the role of similarity and contiguity for the
formation of associations (e.g., Warren, 1921; Turner, 1967).
Matching relies on similarity or overlap, whereas mapping relies
on established linkages. Matching-based systems can therefore
be more flexible than mapping-based systems. They can still
be functional when pre-established codes and linkages do not
exist or work, for instance when novel, unfamiliar stimuli are
presented or new responses are required. This seems to be
the crucial asset for which cognitive systems invest substantial
ressources when constructing sophisticated devices formatching.
Still, we should not forget that matching at code level always
requires and presupposes machinery for mapping at feature
level.
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